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In this paper, we re-evaluate the hypothesis that the introduction of the IFRS has an impact on 
the timeliness of loss recognition. We test this hypothesis in a data set of public German firms 
that report according to German-GAAP and IFRS, respectively. The parallel use of the two 
accounting standards in Germany provides a unique opportunity to contribute to the academic 
discussion, as well as to the current policy debate on regulatory reform in Germany. Starting 
from the standard time series concept of conditional conservatism that was initially proposed by 
Basu (1997), we implement a wide range of test specifications, including (i) a threshold unit-
root test specification; (ii) a multivariate approach to outlier detection and (iii) various forms of 
controlling for fixed effects. We do not find evidence that IFRS and German-GAAP firms differ 
with respect to their timeliness of loss recognition in any of these specifications - a result that 
appears surprising in light of the more prudent regulation in the German-GAAP, but is 
consistent with some earlier findings in the literature. 
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 1 Introduction
A large body of literature in empirical accounting research has been analyzing the introduction of the
international ﬁnancial accounting standards (IFRS) in different countries, with a focus on timely loss
recognition and conservatism. For Germany, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) have shown that ﬁrms
reporting according to the German-GAAP have a higher emphasis on income smoothing, compared to
ﬁrms who report according to the IFRS, pointing out the lower variability of net income and a lower
book value of equity.1 More recently, there has also been a debate in the ﬁeld of economic policy,
whether the introduction of the IFRS in Germany and other countries have led to less conservatism
in accounting and thereby contributed to the instability of the economy and the severity of the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis. The German council of economic advisors (Sachverstaendigenrat), for instance, has
pointed out the pro-cyclical effects of fair-value accounting and called for stricter, and more prudent,
regulationofﬁnancialinstitutionsthatapplytheIFRS.2 Otherstudies, includingLauxandLeuz(2010)
and Véron (2008) have argued that the IFRS played only a minor role in the ﬁnancial crisis. They
argue that fair value changes on bank income and regulatory capital, both in booms and busts, were
quantitatively not large enough to have played an important role in the crisis.
While most empirical studies for Germany provide information on which set of accounting stan-
dards safeguards best against the incidence of negative shocks (unconditional conservatism), the focus
in our paper is on conditional conservatism, i.e. the question of how ﬁrms react ex-post to an unan-
ticipated exogenous shock to net income. We take a standard measure of conditional conservatism -
the timeliness of loss recognition, measured by the asymmetric persistence of positive and negative
shocks - to re-evaluate the hypothesis that German-GAAP ﬁrms are more conservative. The asym-
metric persistence is an important measure of prudence, because under the principle of conservatism,
unanticipated losses should be written off quickly, while unanticipated gains would require a higher
degree of veriﬁcation. The delayed translation of positive shocks into the books renders them more
persistent in the data.3
The parallel application of the IFRS4 and German-GAAP among public ﬁrms gives us the oppor-
1Other related studies have compared different economies and their level of conservatism depending on the characteristics
of law. A signiﬁcant difference in the persistence of income between code-law countries and common-law countries
has been documented in Bushman and Piotroski (2006); Gassen, Fuelbier and Sellhorn (2006); Giner and Rees (2001);
Raonic, McLeay and Asimakopoulos (2004). In contrast to these studies Ding, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2005) show that
the inﬂuence of culture has a larger impact on the differences between domestic GAAP and IFRS than the origin of law.
Although a higher earnings quality is expected in common-law countries Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) and Ding et al.
(2007) also show that the implementation of IFRS by itself does not increase quality and it has to be controlled for the
strength of the endorsement process, corporate ﬁnance, taxation, and the incentives of management and auditors.
2See the annual report 2008/9, Ziffern 257 to 300.
3Due to the concerns raised in Dietrich, Muller and Riedl (2007) we do not repeat the results from the more convential
earnings-returns regression (Basu, 1997) here. Nevertheless, we also implemented this speciﬁcation and it does not
change the main conclusion of the paper.
4The preparation of ﬁnancial statements according to IFRS is obligatory for ﬁscal years beginning at 01/01/2005 for public
1tunity to assess the importance of accounting standards in a ﬁrm level data set, while controlling for
various other inﬂuences, in cross section and over time. Our main empirical ﬁnding is that German-
GAAP ﬁrms were not more conditionally conservative than IFRS ﬁrms over our sample period. In
most regressions, the asymmetric persistence in our two sets of ﬁrms is not statistically different from
each other. In some regressions, the IFRS are even found more conservative, i.e. they display a larger
difference in the persistence of positive and negative shocks. Furthermore, there does not appear to
exist a trend towards less conditional conservatism over time. The pre-IFRS period in Germany, for
all ﬁrms, is not signiﬁcantly different from the period after 1998, where ﬁrms gradually started to
introduce the IFRS.
In our empirical analysis, we establish the main ﬁnding, using the time series speciﬁcation for
measuring conservatism that was ﬁrst implemented in a seminal paper of Basu (1997). In order to
test for robustness, we also performed an extensive sensitivity analysis: First, we apply an adjusted
version of the Basu (1997) speciﬁcation that uses lagged levels - rather than changes - as right hand
side variable, similar to the threshold unit root test, developed by Enders and Granger (1998). In
Brauer and Westermann (2010), we argue that this speciﬁcation has several advantages, including a
non-oscillating impulse response function to an unexpected shock in earnings and a return to a steady
state in the long run.
Furthermore, we address the problems that are associated with the exclusion of outliers, by using
the multivariate approach of Hadi (1994). We show that a careful outlier correction is very important
in our data set. While the standard approach of excluding the 1% extreme observations appears
insufﬁcient to exclude all outliers, the exclusion of 5% extreme observations truncates too much from
the initial scatter cloud of data points - in a non-random way that certainly affects the results of the
subsequent regression analysis. The advantage of the Hadi (1994) approach is that the outliers are
corrected, while leaving the original shape of the distribution unchanged, a property, we believe,
might be important also in other ﬁrm level data sets.
Finally, in our panel regressions, we include either a common intercept, year and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects,
or apply the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator that, by differencing all variables in a ﬁrst stage, also
controls for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. We ﬁnd that these variations of the regression speciﬁcation have in
some cases a considerable quantitative impact on the results. However, we cannot provide empirical
evidence that German-GAAP ﬁrms were more conditionally conservative than the group of IFRS
ﬁrms, in any of the speciﬁcations that were analysed.
In the light of the conservative German-GAAP this is a rather surprising result. The historical
cost accounting system of the German-GAAP has a strong emphasis on creditor protection, as the
"Niederstwertprinzip" ensures that the lowest possible value is assigned to the asset. A possible ex-
ﬁrms with endorsement of EU-Directive 2002/1606/EC in Germany.
2planation for our ﬁndings is that these standards have already undergone substantial changes and have
become increasingly similar in recent years. A new law to modernize the accounting standards in Ger-
many, the Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz (BilMoG), has just recently eliminated some remaining
differences between the two standards, including the previously prohibited recognition of internally
generated intangible assets, or the revaluation of assets above the value of the initial recognition. A
discussion of the details of the differences between German-GAAP and IFRS is given in Hung and
Subramanyam (2007). Our results also conﬁrm some earlier ﬁndings for Germany. Gassen and Sell-
horn (2006) addressed - among other issues - the timeliness of loss recognition in the two accounting
systems in a related regression setup.5 Our empirical analysis veriﬁes these early results for a sub-
stantially larger sample and a wide range of reasonable alternative estimation procedures.
The following section 2 describes our data set. Section 3 points out the speciﬁcation of time series
tests capturing timeliness in loss recognition used in the study. Section 4 presents the results and
Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of this paper.
2 The Data Set
2.1 Sample selection
Figure 1: Histogram of IFRS- and German-GAAP ﬁrm-years
The data for our regression analysis are obtained from Worldscope and include ﬁrms that traded
their shares at the Frankfurt stock exchange within the electronic trading platform Xetra. Data of
banks, insurance companies, or other ﬁnancial institutions are not included in the data set. This
5They use an earning-returns regression, as well as a time series regression of the levels of net income on their lagged
levels, including a dummy variable for negative lagged values in each regression.
3selection leads to a sample of 758 ﬁrms that provide data for the period 1981 to 2008. Firm-years in
which ﬁscal years are not 12 months are excluded, as well as ﬁrm-years with US-GAAP statements,
i.e. ﬁnancial statements that were not disclosed, or statements that could not be speciﬁed as prepared
according to German-GAAP or IFRS. Other restrictions are not applied. German-GAAP statements
that were prepared according to transitional provisions to the international standards are classiﬁed as
German-GAAP ﬁrm-years. These restrictions lead to a sample of 7,199 ﬁrm-years of which 2,724 are
IFRS ﬁrm-years and 4,475 are German-GAAP ﬁrm-years. The share of ﬁrms reporting according to
the IFRS andGerman-GAAP ineach yearis shownin Figure1. Theshare ofﬁrms reportingaccording
to the IFRS increases continuously from year to year. The ﬁrst observations of IFRS ﬁrm-years are
available in 1995. Starting in 2005 the application of the IFRS became in principle mandatory for all
ﬁrms. ThenumberofobservationsofGerman-GAAPﬁrmsafter2005mainlyrelyontheclassiﬁcation
of ﬁnancial statements that were prepared according to transitional provisions as German-GAAP ﬁrm-
years. On the other hand, there is also a small sample of ﬁrms belonging to the Entry Standard of the
Frankfurt stock exchange that is still allowed to disclose statements prepared according to German-
GAAP after 2005. In the regression analysis, we classify these ﬁrms, who have not yet adopted the
IFRS, as German-GAAP ﬁrms.
2.2 Outlier detection
Due to possible errors in the data set, we conduct various forms of outlier correction. In a ﬁrst pass,
1% of the extremes of the distribution of each variable are deleted from the analysis. We also repeated
the analysis omitting 5% of the lower and upper end of the distribution. We also implement the
multivariate outlier approach by Hadi (1992, 1994)6 detecting outliers at a signiﬁcance level of 1%
as well as 5%. To illustrate the effects of the differences in outlier detection, the following ﬁgures
display graphically the results of each of the two approaches.
Figure 2 demonstrates the effects of the standard outlier detection on the distributions of the depen-
dent and independent variables in the regressions. Excluding 5% of the observations at the extremes,
we ﬁnd that the original scatter plot is now roughly transformed into a rectangle. Within this rectangle
there appears to be a downward slope of concentrated data points, but a regression line cannot easily
be placed and a signiﬁcant correlation is harder to identify. In particular, the data points in the lower
left quadrant of the graph are likely to have an inappropriately large impact on the slope. Although
there are relatively few, they are far away from the regression line and will have a quite a large impact
in a least square estimation of the coefﬁcient.
The outlier detection by Hadi (1994), by contrast, results in a scatterplot where a negative cor-
6In the following, we refer to this approach as Hadi (1994).
4Figure 2: Exclusion of 5% of observations at the lower and upper end of the distribution of DNIt and NIt 1
relation of both variables is directly observable, as shown in Figure 3.7 From the visual inspection,
the multivariate outlier correction is clearly the better solution in our data set. As a wide range of
literature, including the Basu (1997) paper, uses the exclusion of 1% and 5% extreme observations,
we report the results for both approaches in the subsequent analysis.
Figure 3: Outlier detection by Hadi (1994) at a signiﬁcance level of 5%
3 Methodology
The time series model speciﬁcations in Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) that distinguish
between transitory and persistent components of accounting income have been used in a large body
of literature on the timeliness of loss recognition over the past decade. Economic income is assumed
7Alternatively, an additional analysis is performed using both procedures of outlier detection on raw ﬁnancial data directly
taken out of the database that has not been standardized in contrast to outlier detection of variables that are adjusted for
regressions. Again, results remain unchanged.
5to be completely transitory and independent of prior periods, whereas accounting income depends on
prior periods trough the delayed translation into the accounts (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Ball and
Shivakumar, 2005). The literature has therefore aimed to document that under conservative behavior,
negative changes in income are more transitory than positive changes.
The regression speciﬁcation used in Ball and Shivakumar (2005) is:
DNIi;t = a0+a1Di;t 1+a2DNIi;t 1+a3Di;t 1DNIi;t 1+ei;t; (1)
where NIi;t is net income standardized with total assets from t  1;DNIi;t 1 is the change in net
income, and Di;t 1 is a dummy variable that indicates whether the lagged changes are positive or
negative. The standard interpretation is the following: a2 = 0 if deferred recognition of economic
gains in accounting income leads to persistence of positive income shocks. Furthermore, a2+a3 < 0
ifeconomiclossesaretransitorycomponentsinaccountingincome. Concerningconservatism, a3 <0,
if losses are recognized more timely in accounting income than gains.
In addition to this standard setup, we also estimate a related regression speciﬁcation suggested in
Brauer and Westermann (2010), that is based on a threshold unit root test speciﬁcation of Enders and
Granger (1998):
DNIi;t = b0+b1Di;t 1+b2NIi;t 1+b3Di;t 1NIi;t 1+ei;t: (2)
Brauer and Westermann (2010) argue that the estimation of the coefﬁcients b2 and b3 in regression
2 has several beneﬁts compared to the estimation of a2 and a3 in the speciﬁcation 1. In particular,
a negative coefﬁcient on the betas would imply a smooth (non-oscillating) impulse-response pattern
after an unanticipated change in net income. The larger b, the faster is the reversion to the mean. If
b2+b3 is equal to zero, negative changes in income would be persistent. If b2+b3 <0 it would imply
that in the long run the persistence of negative shocks would actually be equal to zero. Vice versa,
positive income gains would be persistent if b2 = 0 and transitory if b2 < 0. Finally, losses would be
recognized more timely than gains if b3 < 0.
An important component in the two regressions is also the constant a0 resp. b0. Although most
papers estimate the constant as a pooled intercept, the F-Statistics in our analysis indicate the need for
ﬁrm level ﬁxed effects in all regressions. In all tables, we therefore report the estimate of the intercept
alternatively in the form of a pooled constant, as joint ﬁrm/year ﬁxed effect, or by using the Arellano
and Bond (1991) systems estimator, that differences all data in the ﬁrst step and therefore reduces the
problem of ﬁrm speciﬁc constants. The random effects model, on the other hand, was rejected by the
Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test in all cases.8
8The appropriate estimation procedure for an dynamic panel data model is the generalized method of moments (GMM) if
6Asalaststep, wenowneedtosplittheregressionintotwoparts, byaddinganotherdummyvariable
that indicates whether ﬁrm-years are IFRS or German-GAAP ﬁrm-years. In regressions 3 and 4 this








In each of the following sections, we will focus on these dummy variables and will report whether
there exists a difference in the timeliness of earnings between the two subgroups of ﬁrms. Table 1
gives an overview of the main hypothesis that can be tested in this regression setup:
Table 1: Overview of the main hypotheses
a2 = 0
H0: positive changes in income are persistent for IFRS
b2 = 0
a2 +a3 = 0
H0: negative changes in income are persistent for IFRS
b2 +b3 = 0
a2 +a6 = 0
H0: positive changes in income are persistent for German-GAAP
b2 +b6 = 0
a2 +a3 +a6 +a7 = 0
H0: negative changes in income are persistent for German-GAAP
b2 +b3 +b6 +b7 = 0
a3 = 0
H0: positive and negative shocks have the same degree of persistence for IFRS
b3 = 0
a3 +a7 = 0
H0: positive and negative shocks have the same degree of persistence for German-GAAP
b3 +b7 = 0
a6 = 0
H0: the persistence of positive shocks is the same for IFRS and German-GAAP
b6 = 0
a7 = 0
H0: the persistence of negative shocks is the same for IFRS and German-GAAP
b7 = 0
4 Results
This section reports the differences of the timeliness in loss recognition for public ﬁrms, preparing
ﬁnancial statements according to German-GAAP or IFRS. We compare the two time series models
for estimating timeliness in loss recognition that we discussed above. In all subsequent regression
tables, we show twelve different speciﬁcations: the columns (1-6) in each table use standard 1% out-
lier criterion and columns, while columns (7-12) use the Hadi (1994) multivariate outlier correction.
the residuals of an OLS estimation are affected by serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Baltagi, 2008). We test for
both biases by performing a Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) test for serial correlation in panel data and
the White (1980) test for heteroskedasticity, and we ﬁnd that our results are not inﬂuenced in all cases.
7Among each set we distinguish between data sets that include extraordinary items (columns 1-3 and
7-9) and data sets where these extraordinary items were excluded (columns 4-6 and 10-12). Finally,
for each data set, we run three regressions - (i) consistent with most of the literature, without including
ﬁrm ﬁxed effects (in regressions (1), (4), (7), and (10)), (ii) we include ﬁrms and year ﬁxed effects (in
regressions (2), (5), (8), and (11) and (iii) we use the Arellano and Bond estimator, that takes account
of ﬁxed effects by differencing the data set in a ﬁrst step (in regressions (3), (6), (9), and (12)).
In each of the following tables, we will typically consider the regressions (8) and (9) as our bench-
mark regressions. These regressions exclude extraordinary items in income, correct for outliers, using
the Hadi (1994) approach, and include ﬁxed effects. The other regressions serve as robustness tests
and will be referred to only when we observe differences for the main result.
4.1 The original Basu (1997) Speciﬁcation
Our ﬁrst regression speciﬁcation follows the main papers in the literature, estimating equation 3.
The focus of interest is certainly the coefﬁcient a7 that measures the difference in the persistence of
negative shocks between the two ﬁrm groups that are reporting according to the IFRS and German-
GAAP,respectively. Inordertoevaluatetheoverallplausibilityoftheregression, wewillalsointerpret
the different hypothesis that are summarized in table 1.
Table 2 presents the results of our ﬁrst set of regressions. Among the various options of controlling
for ﬁxed effects, we consider regressions (8), (9), (11), and (12) the most relevant, as the F-statistics
indicate the signiﬁcance of the ﬁxed effects. Our ﬁrst result gives mixed evidence on the persistence
of positive shocks for IFRS ﬁrms. While the regressions with a common intercept and those with
ﬁrm and year ﬁxed effects indicate that positive shocks are transitory (a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on a2),
the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimate cannot reject the null of a persistent positive shock. On the
other hand, negative shocks, as indicated by the sum of a2 and a3 are always clearly transitory in
all speciﬁcations - a result that is quite familiar from the literature, both for positive and for negative
shocks. For German-GAAP ﬁrms, both positive and negative shocks are transitory, as indicated by
the sum of a2 and a6, as well as the sum of a2, a3, a6, and a7; with a minor exception of regression
(9), where the null of persistence of negative shocks cannot be rejected in our data set.
Among the set of IFRS ﬁrms, the coefﬁcient a3 indicates the difference between positive and
negative shocks, which is statistically signiﬁcant and suggests, that the ﬁrms are characterized by
conditional conservatism, incorporating negative shocks more quickly than positive shocks in their
balance sheets. Among the German-GAAP ﬁrms, it is interesting that this observation is far less
clear as coefﬁcients a3 plus a7 are signiﬁcant only in regression (10), but none of the other regres-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10German-GAAP ﬁrms, a ﬁnding that is conﬁrmed when looking at a7 individually, our main coefﬁ-
cient of interest, that indeed conﬁrms that there is a statistically signiﬁcant difference in the degree
of conservatism - with the IFRS ﬁrms being more conservative - in some regressions ((3) and (12)
at the 5% level and (2), (6) and (9) at the 10% level). In our benchmark regressions, however, the
difference with regard to conditional conservatism is insigniﬁcant, at least at the 5% level. Overall,
our main conclusion, that is strongly supported by the ﬁrst set of results, is that there is no evidence
that the historical cost accounting system of the German-GAAP has not induced more conditionally
conservative accounting in Germany, as might have been suspected, following our initial hypothesis.
4.2 An asymmetric threshold autoregressive (TAR) model
As a next step we turn to the threshold autoregressive model that has been initially developed by En-
ders and Granger (1998) and that has ﬁrst been applied to accounting data by Brauer and Westermann
(2010). In Table 3, we ﬁrst conduct the regressions with the dummy for negative lagged levels of net
income. As discussed in the previous section, the interpretation of the coefﬁcients remains largely
unchanged, as do most of the results that were reported above. In comparison to the ﬁndings with
the Basu (1997) speciﬁcation, b2 is highly signiﬁcant in all regressions, providing much clearer evi-
dence that positive shocks are transitory for IFRS ﬁrms as well. This ﬁnding is consistent with Brauer
and Westermann (2010), who document in a Monte Carlo simulation that the standard Basu approach
tends to overestimate the true persistence in the data, while the TAR model correctly identiﬁes the
true degree of persistence. The combination of coefﬁcients b2 and b3, b2 and b6, and b2, b3, b6,
and b7 further indicate that all shocks, positive or negative, IFRS or German-GAAP, are transitory
in all regression speciﬁcations of Table 3. Evidence on conservatism - as indicated by a statistically
different response of positive and negative shocks - is somewhat more limited than in the previous
table. In our benchmark regressions (8) and (9), however, both b3 and the sum of b3 and b7 are signif-
icant at the 5% level, indicating conditional conservatism. With regard to b7 we again have the same
ﬁnding that in none of the regressions the German-GAAP ﬁrms are more conditionally conservative
than the IFRS ﬁrms. In some regressions (although not in our benchmark), there is evidence that the
asymmetry between positive and negative shocks was larger in the set of IFRS ﬁrms.
Our main ﬁnding is also conﬁrmed in two further robustness tests. In Table 4 we use the momen-
tum-TAR model, where the dummy captures the negative lagged changes in net income. In this table,
none of the b7 coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Finally, Table 5 includes the lagged
changes of net income on the right hand side of the regression. This extension is comparable to a
(symmetric) Dickey-Fuller Test, as a measure of persistence, that is typically extended to the Aug-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12the right hand side as control variables. These additional control variables do not change the interpre-
tation of any of the other coefﬁcients. Their purpose is to make sure that the residuals are indeed free
of serial correlation, an assumption made in any OLS regression. In this last table, we again ﬁnd that
the difference between the conditional conservatism between the two ﬁrm groups - as indicated by b7
- is insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
Irrespective of the regression speciﬁcation - lagged levels or lagged differences - we therefore
cannot ﬁnd that German-GAAP ﬁrms are reporting more conservatively than IFRS ﬁrms, a result
that conﬁrms previous ﬁndings by Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) who report similar results using the
standard Basu (1997) approach of regressing earnings per share on returns.
4.3 Timely loss recognition in the pre- and post-IFRS period
The regressions in the sections above already include year ﬁxed effects as well as ﬁrm ﬁxed effects in
ordertocaptureapossibletrendtowardsmore(orless)conservatismovertimethatmightbecorrelated
with the introduction of the IFRS. In Figure 1 we saw that there has been a clear time trend towards
the introduction of the IFRS, a process that started in the late 1990ies and was nearly completed by
the year 2005. In this section, we perform another robustness test, where we investigate whether ﬁrms
in the pre-IFRS period were more conservative than in the period where ﬁrms gradually started to
introduce the IFRS. This robustness test also helps to asses whether ﬁrms that report according to the
German-GAAP have become less conservative, after the use of the IFRS as an alternative accounting
system has become an option. The tables that are displayed in the appendix to this paper follow the
same structure as the previous two sections, but use a different deﬁnition of the dummy variable.
Instead of distinguishing between ﬁrm-years that report according to the IFRS and those who use the
German-GAAP, we now distinguish between ﬁrm-years before and after the year 1998, the year in
which a substantial number of ﬁrms reported according the IFRS for the ﬁrst time (30 ﬁrms). Overall,
the results are very similar to the previous sections. As the difference between the pre- and post-
1998 period is statistically insigniﬁcant in nearly all regressions,9 we conclude that the IFRS ﬁrms are
neither less conditionally conservative (as shown in the previous sections), nor have they indirectly
contributed to a trend towards less conservatism for the whole set of ﬁrms in our sample.
5 Conclusions
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has triggered an economic policy discussion in Germany (as well as in other
countries) that already has been an important part of accounting research for several years. Do the





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14fair value based IFRS erode the incentives for conservative accounting that were inherent in the old
‘Handelsgesetzbuch’ in Germany? Are they, at least in part, responsible for the severity of the 2008
ﬁnancial crisis? To contribute to ﬁnding an answer to these questions, we used a large ﬁrm level data
set of public German ﬁrms that allows us to uncover the impact of ﬁnancial standards, due to their
parallel use over several years in Germany.
Although we do not challenge earlier ﬁndings on unconditional conservatism, we ﬁnd compelling
evidence that German-GAAP ﬁrms have not been more conditionally conservative than ﬁrms report-
ing according to IFRS. None of our regressions indicates that the asymmetric persistence between
positive and negative shocks has been more pronounced in the set of ﬁrms reporting according to the
German-GAAP. In most regressions, this difference between the two accounting standards is insignif-
icant. Depending on the speciﬁcation of the regression we even ﬁnd that the opposite relationship
holds in some cases.
With regard to the policy discussion on the reform of accounting standards, our ﬁndings clearly
provide only one particular aspect of conservatism. It shows how ﬁrms react ex post to an unantici-
pated shock in earnings. In a broader discussion of the issue, one would certainly need to take into
account other aspects, in particular the unconditional conservatism - the extend to which accounting
systems safeguard against the incidence of shocks - that has been documented previously in the lit-
erature. However our ﬁndings indicate that the empirical arguments in favor of a return to the more
prudent German-GAAP appear to be more complex than often assumed in public policy discussions
on this issue.
Our paper also addresses some econometric issues of the time series approach to measuring con-
servatism in accounting income. We ﬁnd that some of the results are sensitive to reasonable alternative
speciﬁcations of the regression. In the sensitivity analysis, we ﬁnd that changes in the speciﬁcation,
such as the method of outlier correction, the inclusion of ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, and variation in the time
series approach, have a substantial quantitative impact on the results of the empirical exercise, al-
though they qualitatively do not change the conclusions. In the paper we therefore highlight the need
to ﬁnd an optimal speciﬁcation that ﬁts to each respective data set and the need to establish a toolkit for
ﬁnding such an optimal speciﬁcation when analyzing the persistence in income. In our view, a multi-
variate outlier correction, an inclusion of ﬁxed effects, and a classical unit root-type test speciﬁcation
would be an important part of this toolkit.
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17Table 6: Regression of change in earnings on lagged change in earnings for all ﬁrm-years (Basu (1997)-speciﬁcation)
DNIi;t = a0 +a1Di;t 1 +a2DNIi;t 1 +a3Di;t 1 DNIi;t 1 +a4DSi +a5DSi Di;t 1 +a6DSi DNIi;t 1 +a7DSi Di;t 1 DNIi;t 1 +ei;t
DIXi;t DNIi;t DIXHi;t DNIHi;t
- FIYR AB - FIYR AB - FIYR AB - FIYR AB
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
a0 0.003 -0.009 - 0.003 -0.003 - 0.000 -0.001 - -0.002 -0.011 -
(1.06) (-1.12) (-) (1.01) (-0.46) (-) (0.05) (-0.20) (-) (-0.83) (-2.04) (-)
a1Di;t 1 -0.020 -0.018 -0.013 -0.017 -0.016 -0.018 -0.011 -0.010 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
(-4.20) (-4.03) (-1.91) (-4.02) (-3.78) (-3.01) (-3.16) (-2.51) (-0.57) (-2.31) (-1.71) (-1.15)
a2DNIi;t 1 -0.214 -0.288 -0.146 -0.222 -0.306 -0.015 -0.165 -0.214 -0.038 -0.176 -0.193 -0.015
(-5.03) (-5.04) (-1.64) (-4.74) (-4.80) (-0.19) (-4.42) (-4.16) (-0.48) (-4.90) (-4.00) (-0.19)
a3Di;t 1 DNIi;t 1 -0.093 -0.134 -0.088 -0.172 -0.146 -0.477 -0.107 -0.160 -0.073 -0.157 -0.259 -0.248
(-1.35) (-1.36) (-0.61) (-2.28) (-1.28) (-3.05) (-1.92) (-1.96) (-0.55) (-2.65) (-3.00) (-1.84)
a4DSi 0.000 0.018 0.106 -0.001 -0.008 0.075 0.002 0.013 0.082 0.004 -0.002 0.067
(-0.06) (1.93) (5.38) (-0.27) (-0.65) (3.55) (0.67) (1.63) (4.54) (1.27) (-0.16) (3.22)
a5DSi Di;t 1 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(1.11) (0.97) (0.19) (1.07) (1.11) (1.18) (-0.08) (-0.36) (-0.86) (-0.81) (-0.58) (-0.58)
a6DSi DNIi;t 1 0.015 0.086 -0.075 0.007 0.082 -0.200 -0.028 -0.003 -0.245 -0.022 -0.031 -0.359
(0.13) (0.83) (-0.44) (0.05) (0.71) (-1.18) (-0.29) (-0.03) (-1.63) (-0.23) (-0.32) (-2.37)
a7DSi Di;t 1 DNIi;t 1 0.033 0.026 0.124 -0.002 -0.048 0.441 0.072 0.113 0.238 -0.012 0.137 0.459
(0.21) (0.20) (0.52) (-0.01) (-0.32) (1.56) (0.57) (0.73) (1.11) (-0.09) (0.93) (1.98)
Obs. 5.337 5.337 4.596 4.805 4.805 4.103 5,177 5,177 4,441 4,638 4,638 3,932
R2 0.050 0.081 - 0.075 0.099 - 0.037 0.069 - 0.060 0.085 -
a2 +a3 -0.307** -0.422** -0.234** -0.394** -0.452** -0.492** -0.272** -0.374** -0.111 -0.333** -0.452** -0.263**
a2 +a6 -0.199 -0.202* -0.221 -0.215 -0.224* -0.215 -0.193* -0.217* -0.283* -0.198* -0.224* -0.374*
a2 +a3 +a6 +a7 -0.259** -0.310** -0.185* -0.389** -0.418** -0.251 -0.228** -0.264** -0.118 -0.367** -0.346** -0.163
a3 +a7 -0.060 -0.108 0.036 -0.174 -0.194 -0.036 -0.035 -0.047 0.165 -0.169 -0.122 0.211
Deﬁnition of variables: DIXi;t, change in income before extraordinary items for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after standard outlier detection. DNIi;t, change in net income for ﬁrm i from year
t  1 to year t after standard outlier detection. DIXHi;t, change in income before extraordinary items for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after outlier detection by Hadi (1994). DNIHi;t, change in
net income for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after outlier detection by Hadi (1994). Di;t 1 = 1 if DNIi;t 1 < 0; =0 otherwise. DSi = 1 if ﬁrm-year i belongs to 1981-1997. DSi = 0 if ﬁrm-year i
belongs to 1998-2008. All variables are standardized by total assets for ﬁrm i at the end of year t  1.
The regressions exclude extreme 1% on each side in the standard outlier detection. The outlier detection by Hadi (1994) correspondently contains a signiﬁcance level of 1%.
White (1980) t-statistics in parentheses for the regressions with and without ﬁxed effects. Windmeijer (2005) corrected z-statistics in parentheses for the regressions with the Arellano and Bond
(1991) estimator. **(*) Signiﬁcance at the 1%(5%)-level.
1
8Table 7: Regression of change in earnings on lagged levels of earnings for all ﬁrm-years
DNIi;t = b0 +b1Di;t 1 +b2NIi;t 1 +b3Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 +b4DSi +b5DSi Di;t 1 +b6DSi NIi;t 1 +b7DSi Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 +ei;t
DIXi;t DNIi;t DIXHi;t DNIHi;t
- FIYR AB - FIYR AB - FIYR AB - FIYR AB
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
b0 0.012 0.023 - 0.008 0.012 - 0.009 0.013 - 0.007 0.017 -
(3.90) (3.66) (-) (3.38) (2.10) (-) (3.84) (2.30) (-) (3.96) (3.60) (-)
b1Di;t 1 -0.012 -0.014 -0.024 -0.018 -0.016 -0.032 -0.005 -0.011 -0.017 -0.015 -0.019 -0.019
(-1.54) (-1.73) (-2.19) (-2.67) (-2.04) (-3.03) (-0.81) (-1.70) (-1.73) (-2.96) (-3.38) (-2.17)
b2NIi;t 1 -0.341 -0.590 -0.616 -0.361 -0.606 -0.706 -0.292 -0.520 -0.478 -0.340 -0.612 -0.672
(-9.77) (-13.70) (-7.43) (-8.79) (-11.14) (-6.48) (-11.01) (-13.43) (-6.04) (-11.19) (-14.10) (-7.88)
b3Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 -0.041 -0.272 -0.272 -0.079 -0.225 -0.210 -0.094 -0.334 -0.343 -0.146 -0.259 -0.182
(-0.63) (-3.45) (-2.74) (-1.16) (-2.76) (-1.48) (-2.04) (-5.34) (-3.48) (-2.88) (-3.64) (-1.53)
b4DSi -0.003 -0.022 0.033 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.010 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 0.000
(-0.81) (-2.64) (1.81) (-1.07) (-0.07) (0.00) (-0.46) (1.28) (0.00) (-1.35) (-0.78) (0.00)
b5DSi Di;t 1 0.011 0.007 0.017 0.017 0.011 0.027 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.011 0.019
(0.98) (0.65) (1.24) (1.66) (1.02) (1.76) (0.41) (0.37) (0.83) (0.44) (1.22) (1.47)
b6DSi NIi;t 1 0.110 0.220 0.187 0.079 0.174 0.210 0.078 0.176 0.085 0.072 0.188 0.179
(2.23) (3.46) (2.07) (0.93) (1.68) (1.65) (1.88) (3.33) (0.93) (1.35) (2.43) (1.68)
b7DSi Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 -0.075 -0.030 -0.111 -0.006 0.005 -0.044 -0.071 -0.017 -0.031 -0.157 0.001 0.018
(-0.59) (-0.23) (-0.68) (-0.04) (0.03) (-0.21) (-0.66) (-0.15) (-0.18) (-1.39) (0.01) (0.08)
Obs. 6,125 6,125 5,299 5,563 5,563 4,760 6,026 6,026 5,197 5,407 5,407 4,608
R2 0.148 0.159 - 0.152 0.162 - 0.168 0.181 - 0.193 0.204 -
b2 +b3 -0.382** -0.862** -0.888** -0.440** -0.831** -0.916** -0.386** -0.854** -0.821** -0.486** -0.871** -0.854**
b2 +b6 -0.231** -0.370** -0.429** -0.282** -0.432** -0.496** -0.214** -0.344** -0.393** -0.268** -0.424** -0.493**
b2 +b3 +b6 +b7 -0.347** -0.672** -0.812** -0.367** -0.652** -0.750** -0.379** -0.695** -0.767** -0.571** -0.682** -0.657**
b3 +b7 -0.116 -0.302** -0.383** -0.085 -0.220 -0.254 -0.165 -0.351** -0.374* -0.303** -0.258 -0.164
Deﬁnition of variables: DIXi;t, change in income before extraordinary items for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after standard outlier detection. DNIi;t, change in net income for ﬁrm i from year
t  1 to year t after standard outlier detection. DIXHi;t, change in income before extraordinary items for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after outlier detection by Hadi (1994). DNIHi;t, change in
net income for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after outlier detection by Hadi (1994). Di;t 1 = 1 if NIi;t 1 < 0; =0 otherwise. DSi = 1 if ﬁrm-year i belongs to 1981-1997. DSi = 0 if ﬁrm-year i
belongs to 1998-2008. All variables are standardized by total assets for ﬁrm i at the end of year t  1.
The regressions exclude extreme 1% on each side in the standard outlier detection. The outlier detection by Hadi (1994) correspondently contains a signiﬁcance level of 1%.
White (1980) t-statistics in parentheses for the regressions with and without ﬁxed effects. Windmeijer (2005) corrected z-statistics in parentheses for the regressions with the Arellano and Bond
(1991) estimator. **(*) Signiﬁcance at the 1%(5%)-level.
1
9Table 8: Regression of change in earnings on lagged levels of earnings for all ﬁrm-years (adjusted dummy variable)
DNIi;t = b0 +b1Di;t 1 +b2NIi;t 1 +b3Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 +b4DSi +b5DSi Di;t 1 +b6DSi NIi;t 1 +b7DSi Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 +ei;t
DIXi;t DNIi;t DIXHi;t DNIHi;t
- FIYR AB - FIYR AB - FIYR AB - FIYR AB
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
b0 0.009 0.028 - 0.006 0.026 - 0.009 0.026 - 0.007 0.014 -
(2.61) (4.49) (-) (1.97) (4.67) (-) (3.78) (4.97) (-) (3.27) (3.17) (-)
b1Di;t 1 0.002 -0.013 0.001 0.000 -0.012 -0.002 0.004 -0.009 0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.41) (-2.97) (0.15) (-0.02) (-3.08) (-0.41) (1.29) (-2.48) (0.25) (1.20) (-1.09) (-0.56)
b2NIi;t 1 -0.277 -0.680 -0.647 -0.306 -0.721 -0.774 -0.246 -0.614 -0.500 -0.313 -0.657 -0.747
(-8.42) (-16.03) (-9.60) (-7.22) (-14.50) (-7.67) (-9.98) (-16.23) (-7.44) (-10.54) (-14.98) (-9.34)
b3Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 -0.110 -0.080 -0.064 -0.111 -0.055 -0.042 -0.113 -0.037 -0.008 -0.088 -0.050 0.019
(-2.30) (-1.88) (-1.20) (-1.91) (-1.00) (-0.60) (-3.15) (-0.94) (-0.16) (-2.11) (-1.12) (0.33)
b4DSi 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.009 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.051
(0.51) (0.06) (0.00) (0.11) (-0.60) (0.00) (0.14) (0.37) (0.00) (0.11) (-0.12) (2.14)
b5DSi Di;t 1 -0.002 0.012 0.002 -0.001 0.009 0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.003
(-0.29) (1.96) (0.22) (-0.16) (1.53) (0.12) (-0.52) (1.69) (0.22) (-1.20) (0.18) (0.44)
b6DSi NIi;t 1 0.063 0.246 0.182 0.001 0.137 0.111 0.053 0.243 0.106 0.007 0.156 0.163
(1.19) (3.99) (2.34) (0.01) (1.51) (1.17) (1.24) (3.85) (1.22) (0.11) (1.71) (1.41)
b7DSi Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 0.039 0.019 0.019 0.090 0.112 0.076 0.013 -0.034 -0.019 0.072 0.114 -0.013
(0.49) (0.26) (0.21) (0.77) (0.93) (0.67) (0.22) (-0.51) (-0.24) (0.82) (1.16) (-0.14)
Obs. 5,316 5,316 4,576 4,784 4,784 4,076 5,141 5,141 4,417 4,512 4,512 3,826
R2 0.142 0.151 - 0.144 0.150 - 0.151 0.159 - 0.161 0.170 -
b2 +b3 -0.387** -0.760** -0.711** -0.417** -0.776** -0.816** -0.359** -0.651** -0.508** -0.401** -0.707** -0.728**
b2 +b6 -0.214** -0.434** -0.465** -0.305** -0.584** -0.663** -0.193** -0.371** -0.394** -0.306** -0.501** -0.584**
b2 +b3 +b6 +b7 -0.285** -0.495** -0.510** -0.326** -0.527** -0.629** -0.293** -0.442** -0.421** -0.322** -0.437** -0.578**
b3 +b7 -0.071 -0.061 -0.045 -0.021 0.057 0.034 -0.100* -0.071 -0.027 -0.016 0.064 0.006
Deﬁnition of variables: DIXi;t, change in income before extraordinary items for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after standard outlier detection. DNIi;t, change in net income for ﬁrm i from year
t  1 to year t after standard outlier detection. DIXHi;t, change in income before extraordinary items for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after outlier detection by Hadi (1994). DNIHi;t, change in
net income for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after outlier detection by Hadi (1994). Di;t 1 = 1 if DNIi;t 1 < 0; =0 otherwise. DSi = 1 if ﬁrm-year i belongs to 1981-1997. DSi = 0 if ﬁrm-year i
belongs to 1998-2008. All variables are standardized by total assets for ﬁrm i at the end of year t  1.
The regressions exclude extreme 1% on each side in the standard outlier detection. The outlier detection by Hadi (1994) correspondently contains a signiﬁcance level of 1%.
White (1980) t-statistics in parentheses for the regressions with and without ﬁxed effects. Windmeijer (2005) corrected z-statistics in parentheses for the regressions with the Arellano and Bond
(1991) estimator. **(*) Signiﬁcance at the 1%(5%)-level.
2
0Table 9: Regression of change in earnings on lagged levels of earnings for all ﬁrm-years (ADF-speciﬁcation)
DNIi;t = b0 +b1Di;t 1 +b2NIi;t 1 +b3Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 +b4DSi +b5DSi Di;t 1 +b6DSi NIi;t 1 +b7DSi Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 +b8DNIi;t 1 +ei;t
DIXi;t DNIi;t DIXHi;t DNIHi;t
- FIYR AB - FIYR AB - FIYR AB - FIYR AB
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
b0 0.007 0.009 - 0.007 0.015 - 0.006 0.010 - 0.004 0.007 -
(2.29) (1.29) (-) (2.63) (2.57) (-) (2.36) (1.86) (-) (2.43) (1.76) (-)
b1Di;t 1 -0.008 -0.014 -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 -0.005 0.003 -0.006 0.017 -0.009 -0.008 0.004
(-1.05) (-1.81) (-0.37) (-1.02) (-2.16) (-0.45) (0.47) (-1.03) (1.75) (-1.78) (-1.67) (0.48)
b2NIi;t 1 -0.261 -0.563 -0.416 -0.307 -0.632 -0.735 -0.222 -0.502 -0.303 -0.253 -0.572 -0.628
(-7.36) (-11.71) (-3.77) (-6.82) (-10.34) (-5.94) (-8.17) (-13.14) (-2.94) (-8.54) (-11.67) (-5.53)
b3Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 -0.135 -0.414 -0.480 -0.073 -0.269 -0.196 -0.144 -0.388 -0.461 -0.260 -0.268 -0.157
(-2.01) (-5.03) (-3.87) (-0.99) (-2.86) (-1.38) (-2.78) (-5.38) (-3.48) (-4.53) (-3.56) (-1.08)
b4DSi -0.002 0.008 0.000 -0.006 -0.009 0.000 -0.001 0.011 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(-0.41) (0.88) (0.00) (-1.67) (-0.66) (0.00) (-0.26) (1.31) (0.00) (-0.91) (-0.10) (0.00)
b5DSi Di;t 1 0.011 0.014 0.003 0.010 0.017 0.010 -0.009 0.007 -0.017 0.006 0.009 0.010
(0.99) (1.19) (0.21) (0.95) (1.59) (0.82) (-0.94) (0.66) (-1.23) (0.75) (1.18) (0.93)
b6DSi NIi;t 1 0.089 0.213 0.138 0.124 0.222 0.354 0.060 0.179 -0.011 0.055 0.172 0.248
(1.76) (2.89) (1.24) (1.53) (1.97) (2.47) (1.52) (2.87) (-0.09) (1.00) (1.85) (1.75)
b7DSi Di;t 1 NIi;t 1 -0.006 0.088 -0.047 -0.068 0.037 -0.152 -0.167 0.105 0.040 0.066 0.171 -0.043
(-0.05) (0.65) (-0.30) (-0.47) (0.24) (-0.74) (-1.52) (0.73) (0.18) (0.57) (1.15) (-0.18)
b8DNIi;t 1 -0.080 0.027 -0.013 -0.095 0.009 0.005 -0.046 0.039 0.017 -0.077 -0.008 0.001
(-3.47) (1.10) (-0.43) (-3.63) (0.35) (0.15) (-2.45) (2.06) (0.66) (-3.86) (-0.39) (0.02)
Obs. 5,316 5,316 4,576 4,784 4,784 4,076 5,141 5,141 4,417 4,512 4,512 3,826
R2 0.148 0.150 - 0.151 0.150 - 0.156 0.162 - 0.175 0.178 -
b2 +b3 -0.396** -0.977** -0.896** -0.380** -0.901** -0.931** -0.366** -0.890** -0.764** -0.513** -0.840** -0.785**
b2 +b6 -0.172** -0.350** -0.278** -0.183** -0.410** -0.381** -0.162** -0.323** -0.314** -0.198** -0.400** -0.380**
b2 +b3 +b6 +b7 -0.313** -0.676** -0.805** -0.324** -0.642** -0.729** -0.473** -0.606** -0.735** -0.392** -0.497** -0.580**
b3 +b7 -0.141 -0.326** -0.527** -0.141 -0.232 -0.348* -0.311** -0.283* -0.421* -0.194 -0.097 -0.200
Deﬁnition of variables: DIXi;t, change in income before extraordinary items for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after standard outlier detection. DNIi;t, change in net income for ﬁrm i from year
t  1 to year t after standard outlier detection. DIXHi;t, change in income before extraordinary items for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after outlier detection by Hadi (1994). DNIHi;t, change in
net income for ﬁrm i from year t  1 to year t after outlier detection by Hadi (1994). Di;t 1 = 1 if NIi;t 1 < 0; =0 otherwise. DSi = 1 if ﬁrm-year i belongs to 1981-1997. DSi = 0 if ﬁrm-year i
belongs to 1998-2008. All variables are standardized by total assets for ﬁrm i at the end of year t  1.
The regressions exclude extreme 1% on each side in the standard outlier detection. The outlier detection by Hadi (1994) correspondently contains a signiﬁcance level of 1%.
White (1980) t-statistics in parentheses for the regressions with and without ﬁxed effects. Windmeijer (2005) corrected z-statistics in parentheses for the regressions with the Arellano and Bond
(1991) estimator. **(*) Signiﬁcance at the 1%(5%)-level.
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